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THE DSM-5 AND CRIMINAL DEFENSE: WHEN DOES A DIAGNOSIS
MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Nancy Haydt*
Abstract
In June 2013, the American Psychiatric Association published the
Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(“DSM-5”). The DSM-5 was intended to be an updated guidebook for the
clinical diagnosis of mental disorders. It received mixed reviews from the
mental health community.1 The reception from the forensic mental health
community is likewise varied. The evolution of conceptualizing mental
illness, its origins and treatment efficacy, may weaken the authority of the
DSM and further confuse its application in forensic situations.2 This
Article explores the possible effects of the DSM-5 in criminal cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Like its predecessors, the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders’ (“DSM-5”)3 diagnostic criteria is “primarily designed to assist
clinicians in conducting clinical assessment, case formulation, and treatment
planning.”4 However, courts and attorneys widely use the DSM-5 as a primary
reference in assessing the nature and forensic implications of mental disorders. The
American Psychiatric Association warns: “[I]t is important to note that the definition
of mental disorder included in DSM-5 was developed to meet the needs of clinicians,

* © 2015 Nancy Haydt. Nancy Haydt is a criminal defense attorney, and she is a
member of the state and federal bars in Colorado and California. Her practice is focused on
the defense of those charged with capital crimes who have intellectual disabilities and mental
disorders. Her original empirical research into Atkins cases has revealed trends in intellectual
disability litigation in California and nationwide.
1
Thomas Insel, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, described the DSM5 as follows: “While DSM has been described as a ‘Bible’ for the field, it is, at best, a
dictionary, creating a set of labels and defining each.” Thomas Insel, Director’s Blog:
Transforming Diagnosis, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013/transforming-diagnosis.shtml, archived at
http://perma.cc/TV9R-ZDCK.
2
See id. (“We need to begin collecting the genetic, imaging, physiologic, and cognitive
data to see how all the data—not just the symptoms—cluster and how these clusters relate to
treatment response. That is why NIMH will be re-orienting its research away from DSM
categories.”).
3
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5].
4
Id. at 25.
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public health professionals, and research investigators rather than all of the
technical needs of the courts and legal professionals.”5
Using the DSM-5 in forensic settings has both “risks and limitations.”6 “DSM
diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any
objective laboratory measure.”7 There is therefore a high likelihood of mismatch
between the information available for forensic analysis and the symptomology,
which would be the basis for a clinical diagnosis. Diagnostic criteria and reports of
defendants’ behaviors are also often misused or misrepresented in forensic
applications.8 While it is clear that legal determinations involving mental disorders
should be informed by clinical practice,9 there is no requirement that any jurisdiction
adopt verbatim DSM-5 language, terminology, or diagnostic practices.10
In addition, the law has long been skeptical about psychiatry and
unaccommodating to the evolution of diagnosis and classification of mental
disorders. Unlike other areas of science,11 courts are mistrustful of professional
diagnoses of mental disorders12 and treat forensic mental health professionals as
“hired guns”13 or “professional elitists.”14 Making matters worse, relatively few trial
attorneys understand how to establish the evidentiary foundation for mental health
5

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
7
See Insel, supra note 1.
8
See generally id. (noting “that symptoms alone rarely indicate the best choice of
treatment” for patients with mental disorders).
9
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014) (holding that Florida’s definition of
Intellectual Disability was unconstitutionally narrow and that a determination of Intellectual
Disability must take into consideration prevailing medical practice).
10
See id. at 1998 (stating that “the States play a critical role in advancing protections
and providing the Court with information that contributes to an understanding of how
intellectual disability should be measured and assessed”).
11
There is a stark dichotomy between the evidentiary treatment of mental health
testimony and the treatment of all other scientific evidence. Expert opinion is readily
accepted as fact in cases involving DNA, accident reconstruction, ballistics, and economic
damages, for example. And many courts readily accept as fact expert testimony about
pseudosciences like fingerprint, lie detector, or eyewitness identification techniques, which,
if newly introduced, would not pass scrutiny under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
12
See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956) (“The only certain thing
that can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease
is that science has not reached finality of judgment . . . .”).
13
The Federal Judicial Center surveyed trial judges regarding problems with expert
testimony. “The most frequent problem cited by judges . . . was experts who ‘abandon
objectivity and become advocates for the side that hired them.’” MOLLY TREADWAY
JOHNSON ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., EXPERT TESTIMONY IN FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 5 (2000), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
ExpTesti.pdf/$file/ExpTesti.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/PFH5-GPMQ.
14
See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2002 (Alito, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s
reliance on “the evolving standards of professional societies, most notably the American
Psychiatric Association” (emphasis omitted)); infra note 17.
6
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testimony. Fewer still are able to competently challenge the basis for and substance
of mental health experts’ testimony.15
From a conceptual perspective, many consider science and medicine to be
matters of fact, and consider law to be a matter of societal values. Diagnoses of
mental disorders are often viewed askance due to this fact/value schism.16 Many
view mental disorders with disdain, including judges and attorneys, who view
mental illness to be the result of weakness, moral laxity, cunning, and self-interest.17
Many believe that mental illness can easily be feigned.18 Treatment regimen and the
efficacy of mental health treatment are familiar to few outside the realm of
psychiatry. Many in the field of forensic mental health, particularly expert witnesses
who do not have an ongoing clinical practice, are confused themselves. The
evolution in the understanding of mental illness naturally creates conflicting
literature, which may further obscure the value and validity of informed mental
health assessment.19
Going forward, Part II of this Article discusses the legal and scientific
foundation of mental health experts’ testimony. Part III describes common criminal
law applications for mental health testimony and the relationship of the DSM-5 to
these proceedings. Part IV explains the application of the diagnostic framework of
the DSM-5 in cases where defendants claim protection from execution due to
intellectual disability.
15

Possibly the most comprehensive reference for legal foundations of mental health
evidence is Coping with Psychiatric and Psychological Testimony, by Dr. Jay Ziskin. The
title alone conveys the sentiment that dealing with psychiatric and psychological testimony
is a more arduous task than dealing with other forms of scientific evidence. See DAVID
FAUST, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 5 (6th ed. 2012)
(building upon the foundational works of Jay Ziskin).
16
See generally Bruce G. Link et al., Measuring Mental Illness Stigma, 30
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 511 (2004) (discussing the conceptualization and measurement of
stigma arising from mental illnesses).
17
See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 244
(2000); Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality,
and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed As It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 3, 15 (1999). Justice Alito suggests that the general public has experience and training
in mental disorders: “Under our modern Eighth Amendment cases, what counts are our
society’s standards—which is to say, the standards of the American people—not the
standards of professional associations, which at best represent the views of a small
professional elite.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2005 (Alito J., dissenting).
18
Contrary to common belief, mental disorders are not easy to fake, especially when
the deception must be sustained over a period of time. See Phillip J. Resnick, Malingering,
in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 543, 544 (Richard Rosner ed., 2d
ed. 2003); Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You From Me”: The Insanity
Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82
IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1404 (1997).
19
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 776 (2006) (“Evidence of mental disease, then, can
easily mislead . . . . [O]pinions about mental disease may confuse a jury into thinking the
opinions show more than they do.”).
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II. FOUNDATION
A. Mental Health Experts and the Basis of Their Testimony
Professional mental health organizations have published ethical codes and
practice guidelines relevant to forensic testimony,20 but there is no assurance that
these guidelines or recommended diagnostic procedures will be followed in criminal
proceedings. Forensic mental health experts include psychiatrists, psychologists,
neurologists, social workers, and counselors.21 Mental health experts vary greatly in
clinical experience and training. Postgraduate programs in forensic psychology and
forensic psychiatry train mental health professionals to assess clients for legal
purposes; however, a certificate in forensics does not guarantee actual training or
clinical experience in diagnosis of any specific mental disorder.22 Courts have
generally taken a “one-size-fits-all” approach for qualifying witnesses as mental
health experts under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and equivalent state statutes.23
The result is that witnesses may be qualified as mental health experts who have little
or no expertise with the clinical condition at issue24:

20

E.g., THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 3 (Edward A. Polloway
ed., 2015). This book was recently published as a guide for clinicians and forensic mental
health experts in capital cases where defendants claim Eighth Amendment protection from
execution.
21
George W. Woods et al., Neurobehavioral Assessment in Forensic Practice, 35 INT’L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 432, 433 (2012).
22
For example, In re Robert Lewis Jr. is a California capital habeas corpus case where
the petitioner claimed protection from execution because of his intellectual disability.
Referee’s Report at 1, In re Robert Lewis Jr., No. A027897 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 2, 2012).
The prosecution “expert” testified that his only experience working with patients with
intellectual disability was a brief period in graduate school where he was a case manager in
a facility for individuals with varied mental health problems. Reporter’s Transcript of
Proceedings at 1971–72, In re Robert Lewis Jr., No. S117235 (Cal. June 24, 2011). The
“expert” testified that he never administered standardized intelligence tests for the purpose
of identifying intellectual disability. Id. at 1972–73. However, he was found qualified to
testify as a forensic expert simply because he had “written hundreds of articles on different
things” and had testified in other cases involving mental health. Id. at 1965–67.
23
Per Federal Rule of Evidence 702, to qualify as an expert, a witness must establish
his expertise by reference to “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” FED. R.
EVID. 702. However, this requirement has always been treated liberally. In re Paoli R.R.
Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 855 (3d Cir. 1990); cf. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory
committee’s note (“[T]he expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified
by ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.’”).
24
Sophisticated understanding and the application of the best available mental health
science cannot be assumed from simply holding a mental health credential. J. Gregory Olley,
Knowledge and Experience Required for Experts in Atkins Cases, 16 APPLIED
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 135, 135–36 (2009).
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To qualify as [a mental health] expert, the witness generally need not have
any particular degree or type of experience or training; rather, courts
consider the totality of the witness’s education, training, and experience in
the relevant field. Indeed, the qualifications requirement has been viewed
as “minimal,” and courts frequently hold that criticisms of or deficiencies
in a witness’s qualifications are matters for cross-examination at trial,
affecting only the weight, not the admissibility, of the expert’s testimony.25
Diagnosis for legal purposes can be based on physical examination, structured
interviews,26 psychological and neuropsychological tests, imaging studies,
laboratory tests, and previous medical and mental health records. Depending on the
legal issue, an assessment may be retrospective, contemporaneous, or prospective.
In the context of criminal cases, retrospective assessment is necessary to determine
state of mind at the time of a crime, competency to waive legal rights,27
postconviction competency to stand trial, and intellectual disability.
Contemporaneous assessment is necessary to establish competence to stand trial or
enter a plea,28 to waive counsel, or to be executed.29 Prospective assessments are
speculative assessments conducted to determine setting bail and the likelihood of
success or failure in rehabilitation, the required level of supervision, and the
likelihood of being dangerous in the future as justification for a more punitive
sentence.
For retrospective mental health assessment, careful review of prior medical,
social, educational, employment, law enforcement, and social service records is
essential for a competent and comprehensive assessment.30 These records are also
necessary for competent contemporaneous assessment, and recent medical and
physical records, including laboratory test results, inform the assessment process.31
Regardless of its forensic aspiration, current standards in diagnostic procedure may
require a thorough neuropsychological assessment and neurobehavioral assessment
of cognitive function.32 A reliable diagnosis requires that an expert have education,
25

FAUST, supra note 15, at 31–32 (citations omitted).
Ethics guidelines in psychology warn that psychologists should avoid giving written
or oral evidence about the psychological characteristics of a client when the expert has not
conducted a personal examination. Comm. on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists,
Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 663 (1991).
27
I. Bruce Frumkin & Alfredo Garcia, Psychological Evaluations and the Competency
to Waive Miranda Rights, 27 CHAMPION 12, 13 (2003).
28
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (stating the Due Process Clause bars trial
of a person who is mentally incompetent); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402–03
(1960) (per curiam) (establishing the standard for competence to stand trial).
29
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417–18 (1986) (plurality opinion) (upholding the
common law bar against executing the insane).
30
See Woods et al., supra note 21, at 433 (stating the importance of a comprehensive
social history in the diagnosis process relevant to the criminal or civil case).
31
Id. at 436–37.
32
Id. at 434–37.
26
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training, and experience in selecting appropriate diagnostic procedures and
interpreting the results.
B. Reliability of Experts’ Diagnoses of Mental Disorders
An expert witness may testify about scientific evidence that is beyond the
common understanding of a layperson.33 Mental health experts may testify as to
what scientific information they offer will be helpful and may assist the trier of fact
in understanding and evaluating scientific evidence.34 Evidence is only admissible
if it is relevant,35 and evidence is relevant only if it is reliable.36
The reliability of a mental health expert’s diagnosis refers to the extent to which
two or more examiners would arrive at the same diagnosis.37 Differences in experts’
focus, bias, and technique can account for inconsistent diagnoses.38 Also, an expert’s
motivation may result in confirmatory bias, which influences the reliability of the
expert’s mental health assessment.39 Confirmatory bias refers to a tendency to look
for evidence that supports a preconceived diagnosis or finding based on historical
information, and to ignore later relevant information because the expert is
preoccupied with confirming her initial diagnosis.40 Pressure to form a particular
diagnosis may be inherent in the forensic referral process. For example, a defense
attorney may refer his client for forensic evaluation, saying, “This guy was clearly
insane at the time of the offense, but tell me what you honestly think.” Or a
prosecutor may retain an expert to rule out the presence of intellectual disability,
instructing, “This guy has low IQ scores but we know he’s been malingering on IQ
tests for years.”
The DSM-5 lists twenty-two categories of mental disorders.41 With nine
hundred pages of diagnostic material, it warns “this set of categorical diagnoses does
not fully describe the full range of mental disorders that individuals experience and
present to clinicians on a daily basis throughout the world.”42 Indeed, diagnoses may
have overlapping symptoms and similar presentations. And it is unlikely that
33

FED. R. EVID. 701–02.
FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
35
FED. R. EVID. 402.
36
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (stating that “the
requirement that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability”).
37
GARY GROTH-MARNAT, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 70 (5th ed.
2009).
38
As Professor Faust points out, experts may base their conclusions on methods for
which there is no research or where the scientific evidence is mixed. FAUST, supra note 15,
at 7 (“[T]here seem to be almost infinite ways in which experts may alter, distort, mangle, or
even flat-out disregard prescribed methodologies.”).
39
Id. at 305.
40
Id.
41
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 27.
42
Id. at 19.
34
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complex circumstances associated with criminal behavior are fairly represented in
the diagnostic criteria. Thus, the likelihood of diagnosis agreement among mental
health experts is low.
To understand the degree of diagnostic agreement among adversarial mental
health experts, Professors Matthew Large and Olav Nielssen studied experts’ reports
in sixty-seven personal injury cases where there were opposing experts.43

43

Matthew M. Large & Olav Nielssen, Factors Associated with Agreement Between
Experts in Evidence About Psychiatric Injury, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 515, 516–17
(2008).
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Table 1. Summary of the Large/Nielssen Study44
In a study of sixty-seven personal injury cases following motor vehicle
accidents, reports were written by psychiatrists or psychologists retained either by
the plaintiff or defendant. Inter-rater agreement was measured by a ƙ (or kappa)
statistic in the range of 0 to 1. A ƙ value of 0 indicated a level of agreement that
may be expected by chance. A ƙ value of 1 indicated expert agreement in all cases.
The level of agreement was scaled as follows:






0 to 0.2, poor agreement;
0.2 to 0.4, fair agreement;
0.4 to 0.6, moderate agreement;
0.6 to 0.8, good agreement; and
0.8 to 1.0, very good agreement.

Of the sixty-seven cases, forty-two had reports from two mental health
experts, sixteen from three experts; eight from four experts; and one from five
experts, for a total of 169 reports. Psychiatrists provided 119 reports; psychologists
provided fifty. Fifty-six reports were from plaintiff’s experts. Sixty-eight were
from defendant’s experts; forty-five were from treating psychologists or
psychiatrists. There were 148 possible pairings of reports.
The study found:
a)
b)
c)

Mental health experts from the same adversarial side had good
agreement about the presence of any mental disorder (ƙ = .74) but only
fair agreement about a specific diagnosis (ƙ = .31).
Mental health experts on opposite sides had poor agreement about the
presence of any mental disorder (ƙ = .09) and poor agreement about a
specific psychiatric diagnosis (ƙ = .14).
Contrary to expectation, awareness of a previous mental health diagnosis
appears to contribute to lack of agreement of experts, even experts from
the same side.

The study concludes that error and bias are likely to be present in all forensic
mental health examinations. Where error and bias are known to be present, it is
essential to minimize bias wherever possible. A biased evaluation using accurate
technique is always incorrect. Whereas, an objective assessment using erroneous
technique may be correct.
The Large/Nielssen study demonstrates that skepticism about forensic mental
health diagnoses is justified. There is poor agreement about both the presence of any
given mental disorder and all specific psychiatric diagnoses in reports written by
experts from opposing parties. Experts from the same parties had a greater degree
44

Id. at 515–20.
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of agreement about the presence of a psychiatric disorder but fair agreement about a
specific diagnosis. The findings suggest the presence of both bias45 and error46 and
suggest even “well-credentialed” psychiatrists and psychologists can reach an
incorrect diagnosis.47
Despite skepticism about reliability of evidence of mental disorders and
frequent diagnostic disagreement, mental health testimony is a common feature in
criminal cases.

45

As to bias, the authors note,

Advocates naturally select experts whose previous opinions are known to support
a client’s case. Other possible sources include the understandable wish to please
the hiring party, the financial inducement of the prospect of further work, and the
nature of the instructions and the selection of documents given to the expert
witness by the lawyer. The conclusions of medicolegal assessments may also be
influenced by the interaction between expert and plaintiff.
Id. at 515.
46
Id. at 520–21.
47
John T. Philipsborn, Selected Competence Related Rulings: Useful Lessons in
Approaches to the Analysis of Competence to Stand Trial, CAL. ATT’YS CRIM. JUST. FORUM,
Sept. 2014, at 31, 37.
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III. APPLICATION
A. Use of Mental Disorder Diagnoses in Criminal Cases
Figure 1. In Criminal Cases, Where Will DSM-5 Make a Difference?

Culpability
Sanity

Compentency:
Trial/Plea/
Execution

Mitigation
Sentencing
Death Penalty

Intellectual
Disability

Mental health testimony is common in the four areas of criminal proceedings
illustrated above. Implications of the updated diagnostic structure of the DSM-5 vary
by application.
In most criminal applications, a diagnosis of mental disorder will not resolve a
legal question. Evidence of a mental disorder may inform the fact finder of cognitive
impairment, perceptual problems, behavioral limitations, communication
difficulties, and sensory dysfunction.48 This information may contribute to
understanding deficiencies in a defendant’s decisional and performance capabilities.
But, with a single exception, a diagnosis of mental disorder is not conclusive proof
of a legal condition. Notably:

48
The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence notes that major diagnostic categories
evidenced in legal proceedings are schizophrenia, dissociative disorder, bipolar disorder,
major depressive disorder, substance disorders, personality disorders, antisocial personality
disorder, organic brain disorders, intellectual disability, and dementia. FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 831–33 (3d ed.
2011) [hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].

2015]





THE DSM-5 AND CRIMINAL DEFENSE

857

Evidence of mental disease or disorder is a necessary but not sufficient
element of insanity.49
Evidence of mental disease or disorder is not conclusive of incompetency
to stand trial, enter into a plea agreement, waive counsel, or be executed.50
Evidence of mental disease or disorder may be introduced to mitigate
punishment in criminal sentencing or in death penalty cases,51 but mental
health evidence does not guarantee a favorable sentencing determination.52
Evidence of mental disease or disorder is often presented to support an
assertion of “future dangerousness”53 in order to justify continued civil
commitment as a sex offender,54 pedophile,55 or mentally disordered
offender.56

Intellectual disability, the disorder previously known as mental retardation, is
the sole mental disorder whose diagnosis resolves a legal dispute. In 2002, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Atkins v. Virginia,57 which categorically banned
49

Definitions of insanity are generally based on the M’Naghten rule, which has a
cognitive component: whether a mental defect prevents a defendant from understanding what
he was doing; and it has a moral component: whether, due to a mental defect, a defendant is
unable to understand that his action was wrong. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 747, 750
(2006). Jurisdictions all incorporate one or both M’Naghten components. Id. at 750–52.
50
The test for competency to stand trial is whether the defendant “has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). A prisoner is not competent
to be executed if his mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his awareness of the
crime and punishment has little or no relation to the understanding of the community as a
whole. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 958–59 (2007).
51
A jury must be able to “consider and give effect to [a defendant’s] mitigating
evidence of his mental retardation and abused childhood in rendering its sentencing
decision.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318 (1989).
52
See Yan Xuan & Kenneth J. Weiss, Diminished Capacity: Mitigating or Aggravating
Factor in Sentencing?, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 242, 242–43 (2014).
53
Psychiatric testimony is admissible to prove future dangerousness. See Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 903 (1983).
54
In Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
prisoner’s confinement may extend past his sentencing date if it can be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that he suffers from a mental disorder affecting his emotional or volitional
capacity, which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses. Id. at 410, 413.
55
A current controversy with the DSM-5 involves the diagnosis of pedophilic disorder
and the term pedophilic sexual orientation. Fred S. Berlin, Pedophilia and DSM-5: The
Importance of Clearly Defining the Nature of a Pedophilic Disorder, 42 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 404, 404 (2014).
56
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2960–2981 (West 2011 & Supp. 2015) (authorizing
continued commitment for a defendant with a severe mental disorder who is not in remission
and was responsible for or contributed to a violent criminal act, so long as the defendant is a
substantial danger of physical harm to others due to his mental disorder).
57
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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the death penalty for capital defendants who have intellectual disability.58 The Atkins
decision created a special class of defendants exempt from the death penalty, with
inclusion in that class determined by a clinical diagnosis that is essentially made by
a judge or jury, based largely on evidence from mental health experts. The DSM-5
revised the diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability to be consistent with the
current definition of the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental
Disabilities.59 The DSM-5 definition and diagnostic criteria for intellectual disability
were cited extensively in Hall v. Florida.60
B. Mental Disorders in Insanity Cases
Insanity is a legal construct that does not have a one-to-one correspondence
with any particular psychiatric diagnosis. In most jurisdictions, insanity is defined
as an inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one’s actions or understand the
nature and quality of the act at the time of a crime due to a mental disease or defect.61
Though testimony about disorders like schizophrenia or bipolar disorder can educate
the fact finder about disease process and consequent cognitive and perceptual
impairment, a diagnosis alone does not prove that a defendant was so impaired at
the time of the crime to be unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. A
mere diagnosis is not sufficient to meet the legal requirements of insanity, but a
mental disorder or defect is a necessary element in an insanity defense.62
An insanity defense generally involves testimony by mental health
professionals and may include evidence of prior mental disorders and of family
history of mental disorders.63 Because insanity describes a defendant’s mental state
at the time of the offense, evidence of a defendant’s actions leading up to and
following the event is crucial to a finding of insanity.64 In general, mental health
58

Id. at 318–20.
THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, supra note 20, at 12–13.
60
See, e.g., 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1988, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2009 (2014).
61
The American Law Institute definition of insanity reads, “A person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity to either appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1)
(1985) (alteration in original); cf. infra note 49.
62
In Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006), it was uncontested that the defendant, who
shot and killed a police officer, suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Id. at 745–46. Lay and
expert testimony established that the defendant suffered from longstanding paranoid
delusions, believing that Flagstaff, Arizona, was populated by aliens who wanted to kill him.
Id. at 745. The defendant believed that the only way to protect himself was to kill the aliens
with bullets. Id. Expert testimony established that the defendant believed the officer was an
alien. Id. The prosecution was unable to establish that the defendant knew that the victim
was a police officer. Id. at 746. However, the court (there was no jury) found that the
defendant was not so impaired that he could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions
and hence he was not insane. Id.
63
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 48, at 820–21, 834.
64
Id. at 817.
59
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professionals are barred from testifying about the “ultimate issue”—that is, they may
not state their opinion as to a defendant’s sanity or insanity at the time of a crime.65
Despite the fact that the insanity defense dates back at least to the Code of
Hammurabi,66 the defense is the subject of derision by the prosecutorial community
and the general public. A common belief, fostered by the media,67 is that a defendant
who is found not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) in some way gets off without
punishment.68 This belief is categorically untrue. In fact, NGRI defendants often
spend more time in confinement than similarly charged and convicted persons.69
Defendants found NGRI are required to undergo psychiatric treatment until they are
returned to sanity.70 Though a defendant may not be held in a psychiatric institution
indefinitely without due process,71 a defendant with a history of insanity may be kept
for life, if he is considered a danger to others.72 The federal courts and all but three
states—Montana, Idaho and Utah—recognize the NGRI defense.
The insanity defense is raised in less than 1% of felony cases, and in only one
in four of those cases is the defense successful.73 Diagnoses of mental disorders—
diagnoses based on the DSM—existed in 90% of all insanity cases.74 It is likely that
experts’ conflicting diagnoses, based on bias and error, create confusion for fact
finders in insanity cases, leading to the low success rate of the defense.

65

See FED. R. EVID. 704(b) (“In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an
opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that
constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of
fact alone.”).
66
Andrew Garofolo, Early Implications of the Insanity Defense, HIST. FORENSIC
PSYCHOL.,
http://historyforensicpsych.umwblogs.org/the-insanity-defense-outline-byandrew-garofolo/early-implications-of-the-insanity-defense/, archived at http://perma.cc/2T
JD-CVWT (last visited Mar. 18, 2015); see also Eugene R. Milhizer, Justification and
Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought To Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 724, 734–36 (2004).
67
Richard A. Pasewark, A Review of Research on the Insanity Defense, ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Mar. 1986, at 100, 101–02.
68
See FAUST, supra note 15, at 535.
69
See Joseph H. Rodriguez et al., The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative
Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 403–04 (1983) (finding that “NGRI
defendants . . . spend considerably more time in custody than do other criminal defendants”).
70
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1201(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2015) (“If, upon the trial
of that question, the jury finds that . . . [the defendant] is sane, judgment shall be pronounced,
but if they find . . . [the defendant] insane, he or she shall be committed to the state hospital
for the care and treatment of the insane, until he or she becomes sane . . . .”).
71
See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82–83 (1992).
72
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412–13 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
357–58 (1997).
73
Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas:
An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 334–35 (1991).
74
See id. at 337.
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C. Mental Disorders and Culpability Analysis
Diagnoses of mental disorders may be used in establishing that a defendant,
due to mental impairment or disorder, was unable to form the requisite mental state
required to prove the crime.75 Diminished capacity may also be considered in
criminal sentencing. Under federal law, a more lenient sentence may be warranted
if a defendant committed a crime while suffering from a serious mental illness
(“SMI”), which significantly reduced the defendant’s mental capacity, and the
reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the
offense.76
The diagnoses included in the category of serious mental illness have long been
a topic of debate. Does everyone with bipolar disorder have SMI? Does everyone
with an eating disorder have SMI? Is intellectual disability an SMI? In 1992, the
U.S. secretary of Health and Human Services developed the federal definition of
SMI:
“[A]dults with a serious mental illness” are persons: [1] Age 18 and over,
[2] [w]ho currently or at any time during the past year, [3] [h]ave had a
diagnosable mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder of sufficient
duration to meet diagnostic criteria specified within [the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders], [4] [t]hat has resulted in
functional impairment which substantially interferes with or limits one or
more major life activities. . . . All of these disorders have episodic,
recurrent, or persistent features; however, they vary in terms of severity
and disabling effects.77
75
The diminished capacity defense has come under increased scrutiny following the
notorious cases of People v. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981), and United States v. Hinckley,
525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981). In White, the defendant killed San Francisco Supervisor
Harvey Milk and Mayor George Moscone. White, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 614. White was convicted
of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. Id. at 615. White’s “Twinkie Defense” was a
defense of diminished capacity due to severe depression. See id. As part of that defense,
White’s defense team offered evidence of White’s excessive junk food consumption to
establish the mental diagnosis of depression. Paul Krassner, Behind the Twinkie Defense,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2012, 6:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulkrassner/behind-the-twinkie-defense_b_2147393.html, available at http://perma.cc/WC65RLYW.
In Hinckley, the defendant was found NGRI of attempted murder of President Ronald
Reagan. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. at 1345. After reviewing evidence of increasingly bizarre
behavior in the months prior to the shooting, the jury concluded that Hinckley’s mental
disorder prevented him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct. Id. at 1348.
For an extensive discussion on the insanity defense and its shortcomings, see Stephen
J. Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Legal Insanity and Mens Rea:
Beyond Clark v. Arizona, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1071 (2007).
76
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2014).
77
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 58 Fed. Reg. 29,422,
29,425 (May 20, 1993) (citations omitted).
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This broadly inclusive definition of SMI lends itself to interpretation by the fact
finder, who often creates a hierarchy of “seriousness” of mental illnesses.
It is noteworthy that evidence of mental disorder does not necessarily lead to a
lower sentence. For example, in United States v. Lucas,78 the defendant, who was
charged with assault with a deadly weapon, threats, and kidnapping, argued that he
had diminished capacity due to Asperger’s syndrome, attention deficit hyperactive
disorder, and bipolar disorder.79 He claimed that he was in a manic state due to a
reaction to the psychotropic drug Provigil and that his mental state was
compromised.80 The plea deal allowed for a sentence within the range of seven years
to life imprisonment.81 The judge rejected Lucas’s diminished capacity argument.82
Indeed, the judge identified bad conduct that preceded the Provigil treatment and
determined that Provigil did not create diminished capacity in the defendant.83 The
judge then found no mitigation by virtue of diminished capacity and sentenced Lucas
to 17.5 years.84
In conclusion, evidence of mental disorders is a critical component of an
insanity defense. However the presence of a diagnosis, even in conjunction with
delusional beliefs, may not persuade a fact finder of reduced culpability.
D. Guilty but Mentally Ill
“Guilty but mentally ill” (“GBMI”) is a legal construct that discards any
requirement for a judge or jury to determine a defendant’s state of mind at the time
of the commission of a crime.85 GBMI was first established in Michigan in 1975,
expressly to reduce the number of NGRI verdicts.86 Now, twenty states have
attempted to reduce NGRI verdicts by allowing the alternative verdict of GBMI.87
The stated purpose of this verdict is to reduce the number of successful insanity
defenses by offering an intermediate verdict between guilty and NGRI.88

78

670 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 788.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 789.
83
Id. at 789, 793.
84
Id. at 789.
85
See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 75, at 1122.
86
Jennifer S. Bard, Re-arranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: Why the Incarceration
of Individuals with Serious Mental Illness Violates Public Health, Ethical, and
Constitutional Principles and Therefore Cannot Be Made Right by Piecemeal Changes to
the Insanity Defense, 5 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 37–38 (2005).
87
Id.
88
See Scott Leigh Sherman, Guilty but Mentally Ill: A Retreat from the Insanity
Defense, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 237, 254 (1981).
79
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The definition of GBMI varies from state to state. Some states define GBMI as
“not insane but was suffering from a mental illness.”89 GBMI gives jurors the
impression that there is an intermediate verdict between guilty and NGRI, and
provides an avenue to avoid the ethical conflict many feel about the insanity defense.
Studies show jurors believe that a finding of GBMI in some way diminishes the
culpability of a defendant90 and gives the illusion of compassionate treatment of a
criminal defendant. In fact, a defendant who pleads NGRI and is found GBMI often
receives a harsher sentence than those who are simply found guilty.91 In the majority
of GBMI verdicts, the defendant receives no psychiatric or mental health
treatment,92 clearly in violation of Estelle v. Gamble.93 The American Psychiatric
Association,94 American Psychological Association,95 and American Bar
Association96 all oppose the GBMI verdict.
E. Mental Disorders in the Consideration of Competence to Be Executed
In Ford v. Wainwright,97 the U.S. Supreme Court held that executing a person
who is presently incompetent violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against
cruel and unusual punishment.98 There, in accordance with Florida law, three stateappointed psychiatrists interviewed Ford, a condemned inmate.99 But contrary to the
evidence,100 Ford was found to have the mental capacity to understand the nature of
89

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-2(c) (West 2002 & Supp. 2014).
NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE LAW 295–96
(1995); Norman J. Finkel & Solomon M. Fulero, Insanity: Making Law in the Absence of
Evidence, 11 MED. & L. 383, 395–97, 400 (1992).
91
Lisa A. Callahan et al., Measuring the Effects of the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI)
Verdict, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 447, 447, 449 (1992).
92
See Hanke Gratteau, Little Help for ‘Guilty but Mentally Ill’, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 30,
1985), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-04-30/news/8501260304_1_mental-healthillinois-department-guilty, archived at http://perma.cc/CST3-978K.
93
429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (holding that prisoners have a right to medical care).
94
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 1 (2007),
available at http://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Learn/Archives/Position-2007Insanity-Defense.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D3SS-ZH8H.
95
Council Policy Manual: Chapter XII. Public Interest (Part 1), AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/about/policy/chapter-12.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/3GUY
-AM2F (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
96
See Mental Health, AM. BAR ASS’N, available at http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_mentalhealth_blk.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/7KWJ-BHF7 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (“Statutes which
supplant or supplement the verdict of not guilty by reason of mental nonresponsibility
[insanity] with a verdict of guilty but mentally ill should not be enacted.” (alteration in
original)).
97
477 U.S. 399 (1986).
98
Id. at 409–10.
99
Id. at 403–04.
100
Consider this segment of the transcript of the experts’ interview and report:
90
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the death penalty and the reason it was imposed.101 And under Florida law, Ford had
no opportunity to cross-examine the State’s handpicked experts.102 The U.S.
Supreme Court was skeptical of the fundamental fairness of the process:
Cross-examination of the psychiatrists, or perhaps a less formal
equivalent, would contribute markedly to the process of seeking truth in
sanity disputes by bringing to light the bases for each expert’s beliefs, the
precise factors underlying those beliefs, any history of error or caprice of
the examiner, any personal bias with respect to the issue of capital
punishment, the expert’s degree of certainty about his or her own
conclusions, and the precise meaning of ambiguous words used in the
report. Without some questioning of the experts concerning their technical
conclusions, a factfinder simply cannot be expected to evaluate the various
opinions, particularly when they are themselves inconsistent.103

The guard stands outside my cell and reads my mind. Then he puts it on tape
and sends it to the Reagans and CBS . . . I know there is some sort of death penalty,
but I’m free to go whenever I want because it would be illegal and the executioner
would be executed . . . CBS is trying to do a movie about my case . . . I know the
KKK and news reporters all disrupting me and CBS knows it. Just call CBS crime
watch . . . there are all kinds of people in pipe alley (an area behind Mr. Ford’s
cell) bothering me—Sinatra, Hugh Heffner, people from the dog show, Richard
Burr, my sisters and brother trying to sign the death warrants so they don’t keep
bothering me . . . I never see them, I only hear them especially at night. (Note that
Mr. Ford denies seeing these people in his delusions. This suggests that he is
honestly reporting what his mental processes are.) I won’t be executed because of
no crime . . . maybe because I’m a smart ass . . . my family’s back there (in pipe
alley) . . . you can’t evaluate me. I did a study in the army . . . a lot of masturbation
. . . I lost a lot of money on the stock market. They’re back there investigating my
case. Then this guy motions with his finger like when I pulled the trigger. Come
on back you’ll see what they’re up to—Reagan’s back there too. Me and Gail
bought the prison and I have to sell it back. State and federal prisons. We changed
all the other counties and because we’ve got a pretty good group back there I’m
completely harmless. That’s how Jimmy Hoffa got it. My case is gonna save me.
Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.4, Ford, 477 U.S. 399 (No. 85-5542) (noting that the comments in
parenthesis are those of Dr. Kaufman). “Dr. Barnard agreed with Dr. Halleck and further
concluded that Dr. Ivory’s crucial inferential finding, that Mr. Ford was feigning psychosis
because his cell was far better organized than his thought processes seemed to be . . . had no
basis in the medical literature.” Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
101
Ford, 477 U.S. at 404.
102
Id. at 415 (plurality opinion).
103
Id.; see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983) (stating that there are
doctors who are willing to testify at sentencing hearings whose opinions are inconsistent with
each other and the American Psychiatric Association’s views).
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Ford restated the common law104 and established that a competency assessment
is subject to due process and Eighth Amendment protection from arbitrary
punishment.105 However, Ford refrained from defining how the law should
determine who is presently competent.
Twenty-one years later, in Panetti v. Quarterman,106 the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the issue of competence to be executed with increased specificity. Texas
resident, Scott Panetti, had a long history of schizophrenia and involuntary
commitments for psychiatric treatment.107 He was accused of capital murder for
killing his in-laws.108 Despite being delusional, the trial court found Panetti
competent to stand trial and to represent himself.109 Panetti wore a cowboy suit to
court and attempted to subpoena Jesus Christ, Anne Bancroft, and John F.
Kennedy.110 Panetti was convicted and sentenced to death.111 In habeas corpus,
Panetti claimed that he was incompetent to stand trial and incompetent to be

104

Blackstone explained the common law rule as follows:

[I]f a man in his [s]ound memory commits a capital offence, and before
arraignment for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; becau[s]e
he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after
he has pleaded, the pri[s]oner becomes mad, he [s]hall not be tried; for how can
he make his defence? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he lo[s]es his [s]en[s]es
before judgment, judgment [s]hall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he
becomes of non[s]ane memory, execution [s]hall be [s]tayed: for peradventure,
[s]ays the humanity of the Engli[s]h law, had the pri[s]oner been of [s]ound
memory, he might have alleged [s]omething in [s]tay of judgment or execution.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24–25 (citations omitted).
105
Ford, 477 U.S. at 409–10; id. at 413–14 (plurality opinion).
106
551 U.S. 930 (2007).
107
Id. at 936. For a recitation of Panetti’s history of mental disorders presented in his
state court post-conviction proceedings, see Brief for Respondent at 3–10, Panetti, 551 U.S.
930 (No. 06-6407), 2007 WL 978432, at *3–10.
108
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 935–36.
109
Id. at 936.
110
Ex parte Panetti, 326 S.W.3d 615, 617–18 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (per curiam)
(“Scott dressed in a ‘Tom Mix’ style costume like an old TV western. Scott wore his hat in
Court. He had pants that looked like leather suede tucked into his cowboy boots. He wore a
cowboy style shirt with a bandana. The shirt was the double fold over type western shirt. One
shirt was a green color, the other was burgundy. Scott wore a big cowboy hat that hung on a
string over his back. It was a joke. It was like out of a dime store novel. Scott constantly used
an old west vernacular in his speech. He used words like ‘bronc steer,’ ‘run away mule,’ and
‘shoe the bosses’ hosses.’” (quoting Panetti’s standy counsel’s affidavit filed at trial)); Chase
Hoffberger, Death Watch: Executing the Mentally (and Physically) Ill, AUSTIN CHRON.
(Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2014-11-28/deathwatch-executingthe-mentally-and-physically-ill/, archived at http://perma.cc/86CV-KZRZ.
111
Panetti, 551 U.S. at 937.
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executed.112 The trial courts disagreed.113 After lengthy habeas corpus proceedings,
the Court ruled that, to be executed, Panetti was required to have a “rational
understanding” of the death sentence and why it was imposed, among other
factors.114 “Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an
awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed
from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.”115 Panetti was
granted the opportunity for a competency evaluation.116 Though he was profoundly
psychotic, the trial court found that he was competent to be executed but his sentence
was stayed pending further proceedings.117 In 2013, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
district court’s finding of competency to be executed.118 His attorneys filed a petition
for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Court denied.119 But
his request for a stay of execution pending further proceedings has been granted.120
Despite predictions to the contrary, relatively few death-sentenced inmates
assert that they are not competent to be executed. In some successful cases, evidence
suggests that where a rightful claim of incompetence to stand trial was asserted and
denied, it is likely that the defendant was incompetent for all purposes.121 Most
successful claims of incompetence for execution follow on the heels of prior claims
of incompetence.122 It is estimated that between 5 and 10% of death row inmates
suffer from serious mental illness but only 6.7% have filed claims of protection from
execution due to incompetency.123
Despite diagnoses of profound mental illness, there are many stories of
condemned inmates who seem to fit the Panetti framework of incompetence.124 The
majority of these inmates suffer from schizophrenic spectrum and other psychotic

112

Id. at 937–38.
Id.
114
See id. at 958–60.
115
Id. at 960.
116
Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *1 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 26, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 47 (2014).
117
Id. at *37.
118
Panetti, 727 F.3d at 410–13.
119
Panetti, 135 S. Ct. at 47.
120
Panetti v. Stephens, 586 F. App’x 163, 164 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
121
See John H. Blume et al., Killing the Oblivious: An Empirical Study of Competency
to Be Executed Litigation, 82 UMKC L. REV. 335, 356–57 (2014).
122
Id. at 356.
123
Id. at 354.
124
E.g., Marc Bookman, 13 Men Condemned to Die Despite Severe Mental Illness,
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 12, 2013, 7:02 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/01/
death-penalty-cases-mental-illness-clemency, archived at http://perma.cc/87VJ-6ZFA.
113
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disorders,125 as well as bipolar disorder.126 However, these diagnoses are not
guaranteed to stop their executions. Table 2 provides examples of those who were
likely incompetent for execution.127
Table 2. Inmates Sentenced for Execution Likely Incompetent
Inmate

State

Crime
Date

Diagnosis

Psychiatric
Symptoms

Status

Johnny
Frank
Garrett

Texas

1981

Paranoid
schizophrenia

Executed
in 1992

Larry
Keith
Robison

Texas

1982

Paranoid
schizophrenia

Monty
Allen
Delk

Texas

1986

Bipolar
disorder

Lethal injection
would not kill
him. Supernatural
intervention by a
long-dead aunt
would counteract
the lethal
chemicals.
Auditory
hallucinations
told him that he
was a part of the
apocalypse and
his death would
liberate many
souls so that he
could be
liberated.
He was the
president of
Kenya and a
submarine
commander. Last
words: “I am the
warden. Get your
warden off this
gurney. You are
not in America.
This is the island
of Barbados.”

125

Executed
in 2000

Executed
in 2002

Id. Schizophrenia Spectrum and other psychotic disorders are thought disorders,
which may involve delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thinking and disorganized motor
behaviors. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 87.
126
Bookman, supra note 124. Bipolar disorder has symptoms that may overlap with
those of both schizophrenia spectrum disorders and depressive disorders. AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 123.
127
Bookman, supra note 124.
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Inmate

State

Crime
Date

Diagnosis

Psychiatric
Symptoms

Status

James
Blake
Colburn

Texas

1994

Paranoid
schizophrenia

Executed
in 2003

Kelsey
Patterson

Texas

1992

Paranoid
schizophrenia

Steven
Staley

Texas

1989

Paranoid
schizophrenia

Guy
Tobis
LeGrande

North
Carolina

1993

Delusional
disorder

George
Emil
Banks

Pennsylvania

1982

Psychotic
disorder

Calvin
Eugene
Swann

Virginia

1992

So drugged at
trial that he
snored through
the trial. When
not medicated he
ate his own feces.
He was controlled
by an electronic
implant. Parole
board
recommended
sentence
commutation
based on mental
illness.
Had grandiose
and paranoid
delusions. He
invented the first
car. Smears feces
in his cell.
Involuntarily
medicated.
Believed he could
communicate
with Oprah
through the TV.
Represented
himself at trial
wearing a
Superman T-shirt.
Called the jurors
“Antichrists”.
Believed the
government was
trying to poison
him. His death
sentences had
been vacated by
God, Jesus, and
G.W.Bush.
Talked to animals
and spoke in
numbers.
Institutionalized
from childhood.
Behavior on

Executed
in 2004

Execution
pending

Found not
competent
to be
executed

On death
row

Sentence
commuted
in 1999
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Inmate

State

Crime
Date

Alexander
E.
Williams

Georgia

1986

Arthur
Paul
Baird

Indiana

1985

Percy
Levar
Walton

Virginia

1996

Diagnosis

Paranoid
schizophrenia

Schizophrenia

[NO. 4
Psychiatric
Symptoms
death row was
“bizarre and
devoid of
rationality.”
Saw little men in
his cell, talked to
animals, and
thought
Sigourney
Weaver was God.
Claimed to have
solved the
nation’s debt and
was owed $1
million reward
from the
government. God
would turn back
time and bring his
victims back.
He was
Superman, Jesus
and the Bible was
written about
him. Execution
would bring him
and his victims
back to life.

Status

Sentence
commuted
in 2002;
hung
himself
later
Sentence
commuted
in 2005

Sentence
commuted
in 2008

F. Mental Disorders in the Context of Competence to Stand Trial, Enter a Plea,
and Waive Counsel
Competency to stand trial requires that a defendant have both a rational
understanding of the legal proceedings against him and an ability to communicate
effectively with his attorney.128 A defendant must have “sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and have
“a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”129 In
practice, the ability to effectively participate in one’s defense is crux of competence.
For example, in Dusky v. United States,130 the petitioner was referred for
evaluation by his attorney.131 The state psychiatric facility found him psychotic with

128

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402–03 (1960) (per curiam).
Id. at 402 (quoting the Solicitor General’s statements in the record).
130
271 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1959).
131
Id. at 387.
129
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auditory and visual hallucinations and diagnosed him with schizophrenia.132 Despite
uncontested evidence that he was unable to assist trial counsel, Dusky was found
competent, tried, and convicted.133
One year later, the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the value of psychiatric
evidence of competence to stand trial but agreed that the record deserved further
review:
In view of the doubts and ambiguities regarding the legal significance
of the psychiatric testimony in this case and the resulting difficulties of
retrospectively determining the petitioner’s competency as of more than a
year ago, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the District Court for a
new hearing to ascertain petitioner’s present competency to stand trial, and
for a new trial if petitioner is found competent.134
In addition, from 1996 to 1998, the National Institute of Mental Health in
conjunction with the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation investigated
adult competence to stand trial. One outcome was the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool—Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA).135 The study determined:








132

Approximately 10 percent of all criminal defendants are perceived by
their attorneys as having potentially impaired competence. . . .
[D]efendants of doubtful competence are usually not referred by their
attorneys for a formal mental health evaluation.
A defendant may need several different capacities to be competent to
proceed with criminal adjudication . . . . It is not sufficient to assess
only one capacity to evaluate adjudicative competence: a defendant
with mental disorder may not have an impairment on the assessed
capacity, even though other capacities required for adjudicative
competence are impaired.
A person whose competence is impaired for one legal purpose . . .
does not necessarily lack competence for other legal purposes (e.g.,
adjudicating his or her criminal case). Conversely, a person who is
competent for one legal purpose may have impairments in
competence for other legal purposes.
While no clinical diagnosis by itself indicates incompetence,
competence-related impairments regarding criminal adjudication are

Id. at 387–89.
Id. at 386–87, 389.
134
Dusky, 362 U.S. at 403.
135
The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study, MACARTHUR RES. NETWORK ON
MENTAL HEALTH & L., http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/adjudicate.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/HUY7-L7V3 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
133

870

UTAH LAW REVIEW





[NO. 4

strongly associated with symptoms of severe mental disorder, and
particularly with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. . . .
When defendants hospitalized for restoration of competence were
retested with [the MacCAT-CA], significant improvement in
decision making abilities was observed for those defendants who
were treated and referred back to court as having been restored to
competence. . . .
Empirical information is now available to inform judges and
legislators as they set [legal] standards [for competence].136

“For clinical information to be relevant in addressing legal questions of
competence, examiners must present the logic that links these observations to the
specific abilities and capacities with which the law is concerned.”137 Though
standardized measurements of competence suggest an objective assessment, there is
still a prevalence of the attitude that “I’ll know it when I see it”138 in a determination
of competence to stand trial. Competence to enter a plea is held to the same standard
as competency to stand trial.139
In setting a standard of competence to stand trial, the Court has focused directly
upon a defendant’s ability to consult with his lawyer.140 Dusky suggests that
choosing to forgo trial counsel presents a different set of circumstances than the
mental competency determination for a defendant to stand trial.141
Indiana v. Edwards142 recognized that the nature of a defendant’s mental illness
may “vary over time” and interfere with a defendant’s “functioning at different times
in different ways.”143 Edwards cautions against the use of a single competency
standard to decide “both whether a defendant who is represented can proceed to trial
and whether a defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself.”144
Finally, competency to stand trial, particularly in death penalty cases, is a
frequent subject of litigation in habeas corpus. Dusky, Panetti, and Edwards
demonstrate that the prospect of successful retrospective assessment of competency
is dim.

136

Id.
THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS 13 (2d ed. 2003).
138
See JOHN PARRY, CRIMINAL MENTAL HEALTH AND DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE
AND TESTIMONY 61–62, 297 (2009) (stating that there are still a number of judges who apply
competence measurements subjectively on a case-by-case basis).
139
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399 (1993).
140
“[T]he test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . . .” Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (quoting the Solicitor General’s statements in the record).
141
See id. at 402–03.
142
554 U.S. 164 (2008).
143
Id. at 175.
144
Id. at 165.
137
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G. Mental Disorders in the Context of Death Penalty Mitigation
The death penalty is limited to offenders who commit the most serious crimes,
“whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”145
Sentencing decisions in capital cases are supposed to be based on individualized
considerations of the offender and the crime.146 Jurors are required to consider
circumstances that make a death sentence more appropriate (aggravating factors)
and circumstances that make a life sentence more appropriate (mitigating factors).147
Mitigating factors can include “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.”148 Mitigating factors involving mental health experts
include mental illness, intellectual impairments, family mental health history, and
childhood trauma.149 Aggravating factors are defined by statute150 and, in some
states, there are so many statutory aggravating factors that most murders would
qualify for the death penalty.151
145

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 568 (2005)).
146
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (plurality opinion).
147
Id. at 196–97.
148
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). For example, the
Model Penal Code mitigating factors cited in Gregg include the following:
The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. . . . The murder
was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance. . . . The victim was a participant in the defendant’s
homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act. . . . The murder was
committed under circumstances which the defendant believed to provide a moral
justification or extenuation for his conduct. . . . The defendant was an accomplice
in a murder committed by another person and his participation in the homicidal
act was relatively minor. . . . The defendant acted under duress or under the
domination of another person. . . . At the time of the murder, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental
disease or defect or intoxication. . . . The youth of the defendant at the time of the
crime.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193–94 n.44 (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
149
See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE
SHAME OF STATES 30–31 (2013) (listing the four-part test created from Gregg by Professor
James Liebman); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193–94 n.44 (plurality opinion) (noting the
Model Penal Code mitigating factors that may be considered in death penalty sentencing).
150
For a list of aggravating factors, see Aggravating Factors for Capital Punishment
by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/aggravatingfactors-capital-punishment-state, archived at http://www.perma.cc/SB27-SS7X (last visited
Mar. 2, 2015).
151
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2014 & Supp. 2015) (listing twenty-two
different circumstances that make a crime suitable for the death penalty).
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Perhaps more so than in most other criminal proceedings, evidence of mental
illness is a major component of mitigation.152 This is not to say that evidence of
mental illness is determinative of a sentence of life imprisonment. Of the last one
hundred offenders executed before June 2014, evidence showed that fifty-four “had
been diagnosed with or displayed symptoms of severe mental illness.”153 Among
those, “six . . . were diagnosed with schizophrenia, three with bipolar disorder, and
nine with post-traumatic stress disorder.”154 Six had attempted suicide.155 And the
most prevalent mental illness was chronic drug addiction.156 The evidence
demonstrated that their mental illnesses impaired their “ability to think clearly,
manage emotions, make decisions, [and] relate to others, and cause[d] unpredictable
and disorganized behavior.”157
Evidence of mental disorder or impairment is used both as a sword and a shield
in capital cases.158 Studies demonstrate that two substantive issues are the primary
subjects of mental health testimony in capital sentencing.159 First, evidence of mental
illness or impairment is offered to reduce the defendant’s culpability to the degree
that execution would not be appropriate—that is, to show that the defendant is not
“the worst of the worst.”160 In rebuttal, the State offers evidence of the likelihood
that a defendant will continue to be dangerous—“future dangerousness”—to
persuade the jury that execution is justified.161 Note that future dangerousness has
been shown to play a prominent role in jury deliberations, even to the extent that it
may overshadow mitigating evidence.162

152

PERLIN, supra note 149, at 30 (“The importance of mitigating evidence at the penalty
stage ‘cannot be overestimated’.” (quoting Welsh S. White, Capital Punishment’s Future,
91 MICH. L. REV. 1429, 1434 (1992))).
153
Robert J. Smith et al., The Failure of Mitigation?, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 1221, 1241–
1245 (2014).
154
Id. at 1245 (citations omitted).
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. (citation omitted).
158
PERLIN, supra note 149, at 33 (“[M]itigating evidence is any evidence that the jury
could reasonably find warrants a sentence less than death.”).
159
See John H. Montgomery et al., Expert Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Juror
Responses, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 509, 510 (2005).
160
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (“Capital punishment must be limited
to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” (quoting Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002))).
161
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983). Future dangerousness is arguably
inadmissible due to irrelevance. Predictions of future dangerousness are, by nature, purely
speculative, and rarely correct. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, noted that in the prediction
of future dangerousness “such testimony is wrong two times out of three.” Id. at 916
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162
See John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always “At
Issue”, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 404 (2001).

2015]

THE DSM-5 AND CRIMINAL DEFENSE

873

Professor John H. Montgomery and his colleagues studied the influence of
prosecution and defense mental health experts on jurors’ assessment of a defendant’s
dangerousness, mental stability or craziness, severity of a crime, and remorse—
significant aggravating or mitigating issues where mental health evidence was likely
to be influential.163 The results of this study were surprising:








“Psychiatric expert testimony presented by the prosecution during penalty
phases did not significantly correlate with jurors’ impressions of a
defendant’s future dangerousness . . . .”164
“Psychiatric expert testimony presented by the defense during the penalty
phases significantly and positively correlated with jurors’ impressions of
a defendant’s mental abnormality . . . .”165
A “defendant’s perceived dangerousness, craziness, and instability on
average were less when neither state nor defense psychiatric testimony
was presented.”166
A defendant’s perceived lack of remorse correlated significantly with a
finding of future dangerousness.167
Defense psychiatric testimony positively influenced a juror’s assessment
of craziness (i.e., defendant “went crazy when he committed the crime”).
State psychiatric testimony had little influence when defense psychiatric
testimony was presented on the issue of craziness.168
Defense psychiatric testimony positively influenced a juror’s assessment
of mental instability, (i.e., “defendant is mentally unstable or disturbed”).
State psychiatric testimony had little influence when defense psychiatric
testimony was presented on the issue of craziness.169

Though testimony from mental health experts may suggest a variety of
diagnoses, no single diagnosis has been proven to correlate one to one with a finding
of future dangerousness.
However, the artificial and unscientific characterization of a defendant as a
“psychopath” is strongly correlated with a juror’s belief that a defendant is likely to
be violent in the future.170 Psychopathy is not a diagnosis in the DSM. But the
behaviors associated with psychopathy are most closely aligned with the DSM-5
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder (301.7).171
163

Montgomery et al., supra note 159, at 516.
Id. at 512.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 513.
167
Id. at 514.
168
Id. at 515–16.
169
Id. at 515.
170
John F. Edens et al., Effects of Psychopathy and Violence Risk Testimony on Mock
Juror Perceptions of Dangerousness in a Capital Murder Trial, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L.
393, 397 (2004).
171
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 659.
164
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Psychopathy is typically determined by comparing a defendant’s history with
the two-factor model of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist (PCL). In its latest revision,
the PCL-R, a defendant is assessed for certain interpersonal and affective
characteristics, and for lifestyle and antisocial characteristics.172 It is suggested that
the results of the assessment correlate with characteristics of antisocial personality
disorder, such as impulsivity, aggression, and criminal behavior; lack of empathy;
lack of remorse; deceitfulness; and failure to accept responsibility.173
There is considerable debate about the construct of psychopathy.174 In
questioning the conceptual validity of the usefulness of psychopathy for forensic
purposes, Professor Don Fowles of the University of Iowa notes:
It is not impossible that there is some value in making diagnoses of
psychopathy in a forensic context, but this review should give everyone
pause until research has actually established the validity of such
applications. If in fact the construct of psychopathy does not have
important predictive value, it is morally dubious to make important
decisions on the basis of the diagnosis.175
The PCL-R may be administered in person or based solely on records. The
measurements are largely subjective. And there is no established empirical
association between psychopathy and violence in a prison environment.176 Despite
the unreliability of this evidence, few courts find it inadmissible.177
Diagnoses of mental disorders as defined in the DSM-5 have an unquantifiable
influence in the context of capital case mitigation.178 When a mental health expert is
free to make a diagnosis of psychopath, jurors seem to accept as proven the
aggravating factor of future dangerousness.179 Professor Marla Sandys and
colleagues determined that “mere perceptions” of future dangerousness are enough
to tilt the balance in the direction of a death sentence.180
172

Robert D. Hare & Craig S. Neumann, Psychopathy: Assessment and Forensic
Implications, 54 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 791, 791–92 (2009).
173
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 659. Note that the PCL-R method
of observing and rating behavior to justify a diagnosis deserves the same criticism that Dr.
Thomas Insel, former Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, noted in his blog.
See Insel, supra note 1.
174
See Don C. Fowles, Commentary, Current Scientific Views of Psychopathy, 12
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 93, 93 (2011) (discussing the radically different traditional and
contemporary approaches to psychopathy).
175
Id. at 94.
176
Edens et al., supra note 170, at 394–95.
177
See id. Note that in 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court found that an individual had a
“psychopathic personality” that justified deportation because he was homosexual. Boutilier
v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967).
178
PERLIN, supra note 149, at 30–31.
179
Edens et al., supra note 170, at 403.
180
Marla Sandys et al., Aggravation and Mitigation: Findings and Implications, 37 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 189, 189 (2009).
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IV. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY—WHERE THE DSM-5 WILL MAKE A
DIFFERENCE!
Unlike sanity, competency, or mitigation, a diagnosis of intellectual
disability181 is both a necessary and sufficient condition to invoke the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.182 A diagnosis of intellectual
disability is not exclusive of any other diagnosis, and comorbidity of other mental
disorders is seen three to four times more often in those with intellectual disability
than in the general population.183
In its 2002 decision, Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court defined
intellectual disability verbatim by reference to the language of the then-current
Fourth Edition of the DMS, the DSM-IV-TR, which required an IQ of seventy or
below with concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning which are skills of everyday
living.184 There were few diagnostic details or examples in the DSM-IV-TR of
deficits in functioning.185 As a result, the translation of the DSM-IV-TR’s clinical
requirements for diagnosis of intellectual disability to the legal standards for a legal
determination of intellectual disability has been the subject of hundreds of capital
proceedings.186
181

“Intellectual Disability . . . is a disorder with onset during the developmental period
that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and
practical domains.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 33.
182
See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992–93 (2014); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 318–21 (2002).
183
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 37, 40.
184
536 U.S. at 308 n.3.
The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant
limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas:
communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of
community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure,
health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years
(Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen
as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the
functioning of the central nervous system.
Id. (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 41 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR]).
“‘Mild’ mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50–55 to
approximately 70.” Id. (quoting AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR, supra, at 42–43).
185
See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 184, at 41–49. The description of mental retardation in
the DSM-IV-TR offered very little practical examples or diagnostic criteria and instead relied
almost exclusively on IQ scores to define various degrees of severity of mental retardation.
See id.
186
Note that since Atkins in 2002, diagnostic practices for the assessment of intellectual
disability have evolved. The current standards for competent assessment have incorporated
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Intellectual disability has long been understood to be the result of a large
number of possible causes of abnormal brain development, including fetal alcohol
exposure, chromosomal abnormalities, infections during pregnancy, accidents at
birth, or postnatal trauma.187 Current science recognizes that in most cases of
intellectual disability that have a biological cause, the affected person’s IQ score
falls in the range of fifty to seventy or seventy-five; however, cases exist where a
person’s IQ exceeds seventy-five but their daily functioning is at a level far below
normal.188
The DSM-5 reflects the current understanding of intellectual disability and
provides diagnostic guidance that incorporates current clinical practice and
experience in the diagnosis of intellectual disability. According to the DSM-5, a
defendant or petitioner must, at a minimum, present evidence of the following three
criteria to justify a legal finding of intellectual disability:189
A. Deficits in intellectual functions, such as reasoning, problem solving,
planning, abstract thinking, judgment, academic learning, and
learning from experience, confirmed by both clinical assessment and
individualized, standardized intelligence testing.
B. Deficits in adaptive functioning that result in failure to meet
developmental and sociocultural standards for personal independence
and social responsibility. Without ongoing support, the adaptive
deficits limit functioning in one or more activities of daily life, such
as communication, social participation, and independent living,
across multiple environments, such as home, school, work, and
community.
C. Onset of intellectual and adaptive deficits during the developmental
period.190

scientific research and techniques agreed upon by the American Association on Intellectual
and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) and the American Psychiatric Association. AM.
ASS’N ON INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY:
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 35–40 (11th ed. 2010)
[hereinafter AAIDD, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra
note 3, at 37–38.
187
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 38–39 (suggesting that birth
defects are increased risk factors for developing intellectual disability).
188
Nancy Haydt et al., Advantages of DSM-5 in the Diagnosis of Intellectual Disability:
Reduced Reliance on IQ Ceilings in Atkins (Death Penalty) Cases, 82 UMKC L. REV. 359,
365–72 (2014).
189
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the DSM as “one of the basic texts used by
psychiatrists and other experts,” and cites the DSM-5 by name thirteen times. Hall v. Florida,
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990–2009 (2014). The analysis in Hall directly tracks the language of the
DSM-5. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 33–41.
190
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 33.
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The DSM-5 adopted the perspective of the American Association on
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD).191 According to the AAIDD:
“[Intelligence] is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill or test-taking
smarts. Rather it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our
surroundings—catching on, making sense of things, or figuring out what to do.”192
Accordingly, “[t]he various levels of severity [of intellectual disability] are defined
on the basis of adaptive functioning, and not IQ scores, because it is adaptive
functioning that determines the level of supports required. Moreover, IQ measures
are less valid in the lower end of the IQ range.”193
This marks a diagnostic change away from the DSM-IV-TR’s focus on IQ, and
recognizes that adaptive functioning is a more comprehensive measure of the
severity of intellectual disability.
The DSM-5 incorporated important psychometric guidelines for the
measurement of IQ for purposes of intellectual disability assessment. For example,
the DSM-5 specifies that intellectual functioning must be measured with an
individually administered, psychometrically valid and current intelligence test that
is normed on the general population.194 IQ measurements must take into account a
test’s standard error of measurement of ± five points.195 It recognizes that out-ofdate test scores may be inflated due to aging test norms (known as the “Flynn
Effect”).196 The DSM-5 also acknowledges that a cognitive profile based on
comprehensive neuropsychological testing may be more accurate than a profile
based solely on a single IQ test.197
The DSM-5 directs that adaptive functioning should be assessed using
standardized testing as well as clinical evaluation,198 and advises that educational,
developmental, medical, and mental health evaluations are additional sources of

191

The AAIDD was formerly known as the American Association on Mental
Retardation (AAMR) and is the leading professional organization for study, assessment,
care, and treatment of those with intellectual disability. The DSM-IV definition of mental
retardation was derived from the AAMR’s definition in AM. ASS’N ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF
SUPPORTS 5–7 (9th ed. 1992). The DSM-5 has incorporated the language of the most recent
AAIDD publication, AAIDD, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, supra note 186, at 1, 6–7. For a
comparison of the AAMR and American Psychiatric Association’s historical definitions of
mental retardation, see id. at 8–9.
192
AAIDD, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, supra note 186, at 15 (quoting Linda S.
Gottfredson, Editorial, Mainstream Science on Intelligence: An Editorial with 52
Signatories, History, and Bibliography, 24 INTELLIGENCE 13, 13 (1997), available at
http://www.udel.edu/educ/gottfredson/reprints/1997mainstream.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/U8XY-55BH.
193
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 3, at 33.
194
Id. at 37.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
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evidence of intellectual disability.199 Also, the DSM-5 warns that adaptive
functioning in controlled environments, such as prisons and jails, may not provide a
realistic perspective of a person’s adaptive limitations in the community.200
The changes in the DSM-5 definition of intellectual disability were put to the
test in Hall v. Florida.201 The petitioner in Hall challenged the Florida Supreme
Court’s rule that an IQ above seventy automatically disqualified a defendant or
petitioner from asserting a claim of protection from execution due to intellectual
disability.202 This rule was used to bar admission of any further evidence,
particularly evidence of adaptive functioning, in determination of the existence of
intellectual disability.203
The Hall opinion adopted the definition of intellectual disability directly from
the DSM-5 and accepted the DSM-5’s recognition of the inherent imprecision in any
intelligence test measurement:
For purposes of most IQ tests, the [standard error of measurement] (SEM)
means that an individual’s score is best understood as a range of scores on
either side of the recorded score. The SEM allows clinicians to calculate a
range within which one may say an individual’s true IQ score lies.204
The Court adopted the current professional model of intellectual disability, which
recognizes adaptive functioning as a critical measure in any assessment of
intellectual disability.205 As Justice Kennedy wisely noted, “Intellectual disability is
a condition, not a number.”206
The DSM-5 will have a significant effect in the assessment of intellectual
disability for capital defendants in the following ways:




199

Defendants with IQ scores in the range of seventy-one to seventy-five will
not be automatically disqualified from a legal determination of intellectual
disability.207
The age of an IQ test is a significant consideration in the calculation of IQ
score.208
Any assessment of intellectual disability must consider standard error of
measurement.209

Id.
Id. at 38.
201
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990–91 (2014).
202
Id. at 1991–92.
203
Id. at 1996.
204
Id. at 1995.
205
Id. at 1994.
206
Id. at 2001.
207
See DSM-5, supra note 3, at 37.
208
See id.
209
See id.
200
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Recognition that limitations in adaptive functioning are critical to an
assessment of intellectual disability.210
Recognition that records from infancy, childhood, and adolescence are
valuable sources of evidence of adaptive functioning.211

Following the DSM-5 and Hall, Professor Edward A. Polloway published The
Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability,212 which is an authoritative resource on
the science that provides the basis for the definition of intellectual disability and on
the critical issues involved in its diagnosis. The DSM-5, in conjunction with The
Death Penalty and Intellectual Disability, should improve the diagnostic process of
determining which capital defendants have intellectual disability and should be
protected from execution.
V. CONCLUSION
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition, will become a permanent fixture in criminal
proceedings until the Sixth Edition supersedes it.
Changes in diagnostic classifications between the DSM-IV-TR and the DSM5 are not likely to have a major effect on competency, sanity, or culpability
assessments. The DSM-5 is likely to interject confusion among attorneys and the
judiciary in sentencing and capital case proceedings. But it is unlikely that the DSM5 will introduce significant changes to proceedings in these matters.
The DSM-5 should affect intellectual disability cases significantly by
expanding the definition and understanding of, and the diagnostic procedures for,
the legal determination of intellectual disability.

210

See id. at 33.
See id. at 38–39.
212
Polloway, supra note 20, at 4–5, 11–15.
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